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in the instant case, did not plead a breach of the fiduciary relation,
but rather, a conspiracy to defraud him of his shares. For that reason,
the court probably reached the correct result in denying recovery.
However, the statement that "acts which are expressly or impliedly
authorized by law cannot be made the basis of a claim for damages""'
is perhaps too broad. It seems not to be, but should be, limited to
good faith transactions. Otherwise, the statement may be used as
authority for the proposition that statutory authorization and com-
pliance puts a "shield" over a transaction and thereby bars all sub-
sequent actions for damages. Such construction of the language could
effectively negative the existence of any fiduciary relationship be-
tween majority and minority shareholders in Texas. Without the
existence of that relationship, there would be no protection against
or remedy for self-dealing on the part of the majority. Therefore,
the language to the effect that an authorized transaction is not
actionable should be given narrow application."0
Robert W. Minshew
Amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Substantially
To Lessen Competition in Vertical Integrations
Brown Shoe Company, the third largest seller of shoes by dollar
volume in the United States, proposed to acquire G. R. Kinney, the
eighth largest seller by dollar volume, through an exchange of
Kinney for Brown stock. The United States filed a civil antitrust
suit to enjoin' the contemplated merger which the government
claimed would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.' Upon the
district court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the merger, Brown, also the fourth ranked shoe manufacturer with
over 1230 owned, operated, or controlled retail outlets, had acquired
Kinney, the nation's largest family shoe retailer with 350 retail shoe
stores, subject to certain conditions.' At the trial, however, the
4' 3 65 S.W. 2d at 5.
"But see Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., - Del. -, 187 A.2d 78 (1962), in
which the court stated that the very purpose of merger statutes was to provide a means of
eliminating the minority interest in the enterprise.
' Injunctive relief was sought under § 15 of the Clayton Act, 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15
U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
'Cellar-Kefauver Amendment, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
'The memorandum opinion of the district court stated, inter alia, that: (1) Kinney
would retain ownership of its assets; (2) Kinney would be independently operated and
none of Brown's directors or directors of Brown's subsidiaries could be on Kinney's board
of directors; (3) all profits and assets of Kinney would be identified with Kinney; (4)
Brown could hold but could not sell the stock of Kinney; (5) any newly acquired outlets
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district court found that the merger violated section 7. Brown ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.' Held, ajfirmned: The effect of the
vertical and horizontal aspects of the Brown-Kinney merger "may
be substantially to lessen competition" in the relevant lines of com-
merce within the pertinent geographic markets in violation of
amended section 7 of the Clayton Act. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Prior to 1950, section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed basically
to halt in their incipiency the growth of holding companies and the
growth of corporations expanding through the acquisition of stock
in their competitors.' Section 7 applied only to mergers which were
consummated via stock acquisitions, and the purchase of a corpora-
tion's assets remained as an effective "loophole."' Enforcement of-
ficials' also interpreted the original section as being applicable only
to horizontal mergers,' i.e., the merging corporations had to be direct
competitors.! Vertical integrations escaped unscathed under that sec-
by Kinney would be in the name of Kinney and controlled by Kinney; (6) no Kinney
retail outlet could be closed because of competition with Brown; and (7) Brown could not
take over or close any factory of Kinney. 179 F. Supp. 723, 724 n.4 (1959).
4 Supreme Court jurisdiction rested upon § 2 of the Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989 (1948),
15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958), which states: "In every civil action brought in any district court
of the United States under any of said [antitrust] Acts, wherein the United States is com-
plainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme
Court."
Justice Harlan vigorously dissented on the issue of jurisdiction, arguing that a final
judgment had not been rendered in the district court because the divestiture decree had
not been ordered. 370 U.S. 294, 357 (1962). The majority, 370 U.S. at 304-11, upheld the
finality of the judgment based upon (1) the disposal of all issues by the district court, (2)
the nature of a full divestiture, and (3) the practice of the Court in prior cases. The Court
cited Maryland & Virginia Milk Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
'United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592-93, 597-98
(1957); see Martin, Mergers and the Clayton Act 43, 48, 258 (1959).
The original section 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), read in part as follows:
No Corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen [sic] competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce.
6 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); FTC v. Western
Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1926) (assets purchased through stock unlawfully held,
merger not proscribed); United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14, 17
(1950); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226, 229-30 (1960).
'The Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department are both charged with
enforcing the federal antitrust laws.
' In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957),
the Court stated: "During the 35 years before this action was brought, the Government did
not invoke § 7 against vertical acquisitions. The Federal Trade Commission has said that
the section did not apply to vertical acquisitions." See H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1949).
'International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC,
54 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1931); Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656,
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tion for at least twenty-five years until the 1957 du Pont-GM' case,
in which the Supreme Court held that the original section did apply
to vertical integrations." Nevertheless, for many years prior to
du Pont-GM, section 7 had not restricted corporate growth in
its early stages unless a company purchased the stock of a com-
peting corporation. Congress, cognizant of the numerous deficiencies,
amended section 7 in 1950 to read:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
(Other parts omitted.)
The proscription of mergers which, in their incipiency, tended to
lessen competition, continued to be an objective of section 7." How-
ever, "asset acquisitions" no longer were immune, 4 since the amended
provision stated that "no corporation . . . shall acquire . . . the
assets of another corporation . . . ."" In addition, Congress expressed
the intention to condemn both the previously prohibited horizontal
combinations (mergers of businesses on the same level in the pro-
ductive process) and vertical combinations (supplier-consumer ar-
rangements), which had gone unprosecuted until the du Pont-GM"
case.' According to the Committee Reports, 8 the amendment also
659-61 (3d Cir. 1931); Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 Yale L.J. 1, 65 (1959). Contra, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
In the du Pont case, the Court held that the companies did not have to compete directly
to invoke the sanctions of section 7. According to the Court, the merger came within the
scope of the statute so long as the combined effect restrained commerce or created a
monopoly. However, that case, interpreting the original section 7, was not decided until 1957.
The amendment of 1950 to section 7, 64 Stat. 1125, gave Congressional effect to the du Pont
interpretation of the original provision. The new, amended provision eliminated the require-
ment that "competition between the corporation whose stock is . . . acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition" must be lessened. See text accompanying note 12 infra,
for the text of the new section.
'° United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
" See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
264 Star. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
1"H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1950).
4 "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to prevent corporations from acquiring
another corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets, whereunder [sic] the present
law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corporation." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
" 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
'a See note 9 supra and accompanying text.




outlawed conglomerate mergers (fusion of related and unrelated
businesses), which had completely escaped the purview of the
original statute. By altering section 7 in such a manner, Congress
intended to condemn all mergers whenever their effect "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition" "in any line of commerce "in any
section of the country."'
Brown Shoe is the first major decision by the Supreme Court con-
struing amended section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 To find violations
in both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of the merger, the
Court had to resolve three issues in each plane: (1) what was the
"line of commerce,"" (2) what was the "section of the country,"2
and (3) was there a substantial lessening of competition within the
defined market."3 This Note is limited to the ruling that the vertical
integration constituted a substantial lessening of competition.
I. WHAT Is "SUBSTANTIALLY To LESSEN COMPETITION"?
A. Percent Of The Market Foreclosed
Kinney concentrated on the retailing of shoes, since its leadership
in the shoe industry was derived from its 400 retail outlets. 4 Kinney's
stores accounted for 1.2 per cent of all national retail shoe sales by
dollar volume or about 1.6 per cent of the national pairage of non-
rubber footwear." Kinney's manufacturing plants furnished 20 per
cent of its retail needs, and the rest were acquired from outside
suppliers." Hence, for purposes of determining the percentage of the
"9 See S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
2See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam);
Maryland & Virginia Milk Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
" The product market ("line of commerce") for both the vertical and horizontal phases
of the merger consisted of men's, women's, and children's shoes.
aa The geographic market ("section of the country") for the horizontal aspect of the
merger comprised every city with a population exceeding 10,000 where Brown and Kinney
either owned or controlled a retail outlet. However, as to the vertical aspect of the merger,
the nation as a whole constituted the geographic market.
"The consolidation of Brown and Kinney's retail outlets, the horizontal aspect of the
merger, substantially lessened competition because: (1) the combination resulted in Brown
having 7.2o of the market share on the retail level; (2) the combination enabled the
fusing enterprises, having a small share of the market, to deter competition in a highly
fragmented industry; and (3) the combination gave the combined retail outlets the benefits
of a manufacturer-supplier, allowing them to carry bigger inventories, to sell at lower
prices, and to increase their advertising of shoes.
24370 U.S. at 303.
" Ibid.
26 Ibid. At the time of the trial, Kinney had 319 outside suppliers, 122 of whom fur-
nished less than $1,000 worth of shoes each year. Because Brown, after the merger, supplied
only 7.9% of Kinney's retail needs, only 22 of the suppliers were adversely affected by the
merger. No data was furnished by either party or by the Court demonstrating how many
competitors were actually injured. Therefore, it is not known if the 22 manufacturers which
were injured by the merger constituted the small or the large suppliers of Kinney. See text
infra for discussion.
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wholesale market foreclosed by the Brown-Kinney merger, assume
that the figure 1.2 per cent (i.e., Kinney's national retail sales) was
the dollar percentage of Kinney's purchases for its retail needs. Since
Kinney supplied 20 per cent of the needs of its retail outlets, 1.2 per
cent should be reduced accordingly. The market share thus affected
by the merger was approximately 0.9 per cent, or less than 1 per cent.
So presented, the question then is whether the possible foreclosure
of this particular market threatened "substantially to lessen com-
petition."
In interpreting the "effect" clause of section 7, the Court might
have invoked a flat quantitative approach. Indeed, in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 7 the Court stated in essence that "when com-
petitors are foreclosed from a substantial enough share of the market,
it is not far-fetched to infer a substantial lessening of competition."2
However, in 1961 in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,"5 the
Court dismissed as "quite insubstantial" the closing of less than one
per cent of the relevant market by a twenty-year requirements con-
tract. In the instant case, the Court refused to apply a per se test
based upon quantitative grounds, stating that ". . . the percentage
of the market foreclosed by the vertical arrangement cannot itself
be decisive.""s The Court did recognize that a merger could be up-
held or proscribed per se if the combination was either de minimis
or monopolistic in proportion."' If de minimis in size, the consolida-
tion would not even violate the Clayton Act;" if monopolistic, it
would breach both the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act." Ap-
2'7 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (decided under § 3 of the Clayton Act).
28 Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at 28. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293 (1949), Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, expressed the thought that a
high volume of sales infers a substantial lessening of competition when he said:
It is clear, therefore, that unless a distinction is to be drawn for purposes
of the applicability of § 3 between requirements contracts and contracts tying
the sales of a nonpatented to a patented product, the showing that Standard's
requirements contracts affected a gross business of $58,000,000 comprising
6.7% of the total in the area goes far toward supporting the inference that
competition has been or probably will be substantially lessened. Id. at 305.
(Emphasis added.)
29365 U.S. 320 (1961). The suit was brought under § 3 of the Clayton Act, which
contains language similar to that in 5 7.
30 370 U.S. at 329.
31 Id. at 328-29.
2 1d. at 329. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1961)
(dictum). See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (involving
a tying clause under § 3 of Clayton Act).
13Id. at 328. Sherman Act § 1-3, as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §5 1-3
(1958). The exact point at which a market share becomes monopolistic is not clear. How-
ever, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge
L. Hand by way of obiter dictum said: "That percentage [90%] is enough to constitute
a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and
certainly thirty-three per cent is not." Id. at 424 See United States v. E. 1. du Pont de
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parently, then, a quantitative analysis is applicable only if the per-
centage of the market share foreclosed lies at either extreme. If
though, as in the principal case, the Court classifies the market share
affected between de minimis and monopolistic in scope, a per se test
will not be applied, and "other factors" 4 must be examined to
obviate the merger.
B. The Nature And Purpose Of The Arrangement
One "other factor" important in the analysis of a combination is
the nature and purpose of the arrangement. From the Court's exami-
nation of this element alone in the principal case, it decided that the
Brown-Kinney fusion tended substantially to lessen competition. The
Court found that a merger is analogous to a tying agreement in that
both foreclose a share of the market."5 However, the reasoning is
specious. Any "vertical integration, whether by contract or owner-
ship, necessarily forecloses access to a segment of the market, since
competitors of the integrating firm often can no longer deal with
the integrated enterprise."'" When one corporation purchases another,
one of two purposes normally motivates the acquiring firm: (1)
either it purchases for investment only; or (2) it buys in order to
have a captive consumer or supplier of its product. 7 If one company
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), in which the Court essentially held that the question
of monopoly turns on whether the seller has "power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion" (id. at 391); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 821-22, 827 (9th Cir.
1961) (court proscribed merger affecting 62% of the market share); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-44 (D. Mass. 1953) (75% of the market
share found sufficient).
34 370 U.S. at 329. The majority stated: "In such cases, it becomes necessary to under-
take an examination of various economic and historical factors in order to determine whether
the arrangement under review is of the type Congress sought to proscribe."
as Id. at 332. A tying contract is inherently anticompetitive since it makes the customer
take a different product in order to secure the desired one. The Court has held that such
an arrangement substantially lessens competition even when a small share of the market
is affected. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). On the other hand, a requirements contract does
not have the inherent anticompetitive feature which is so evident in a tying agreement. The
requirements contract is used to supply the needs of the customer and not necessarily to
force other goods or products on him. Also, it is easily terminable and generally runs for
only a short duration. Such an agreement can be beneficial to competition, because a market
for the supplier can be created to insure that his goods will be bought. It also gives the
consumer the benefit of a wider range of goods. Therefore, requirements contracts generally
can be said to aid competition. However, if one tends substantially to lessen competition,
it will be proscribed. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
"s Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at 14. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 523 (1948), the Court stated: "A subsidiary will in all probability deal only with
its parent for goods the parent can furnish." Adelman, Corporate Integration, in How To
Comply With the Antitrust Law (1954), cited in Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at so
n.222: "Integration is always and necessarily an exclusion of competitors."
'7 Cf. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 567-68 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
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acquires another solely for investment, and there are no contacts
whatsoever between the two except the flow of a proper share of
the profits or dividends, section 7 is not violated."5 On the other
hand, a corporation purchased in whole or in part as a consumer or
supplier does affect competition and adverse consequences can result. 9
Brown and Kinney did not plead that the purchase was for invest-
ment only, and the Court held that the merger foreclosed a segment
of the market. Obviously, the nature and purpose approach begs the
question, which is whether the segment foreclosed was "substantial."
The only objective accomplished by the Court's discussion of the
nature and purpose of the arrangement was to show that the "in-
jurious" effects may flow from any merging enterprises.
C. Trend In The Industry And Injury To Competitors
Since 1951, Brown had been in the process of acquiring retail
outlets, either by franchise contract" or by outright purchase.41 In
each instance, Brown significantly increased its output to the ac-
quired retailers." Consistent with its growth on the retail level,
Brown steadily increased its manufacturing facilities until in 1955
Brown accounted for 4 per cent of the total production of the na-
tion's footwear.43 Kinney, on the other hand, was the twelfth largest
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1960); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp.
307, 316 (D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
s The phrase "no contacts whatsoever" should be taken literally. The acquiring com-
pany must completely separate itself from the acquired firm, for example, by having non-
participating stock, not supplying to the integrated enterprise, or completely alienating itself
from any activities of the purchased company. If any divergence from this course of action
results, in all probability the acquiring firm will be ordered to divest itself of the stock.
Cf. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 1958);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 316-17 (D. Conn. 1953),
aff'd, 206 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
as See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
4o The franchise agreement is a written contract with an independent retailer assuring
the supplying company (Brown in this case) that a particular dealer will carry its line
of shoes under certain stipulations. The agreement here further provided, inter alia, "that
the retailer will 'concentrate . . . [his] business within the grades and price lines of shoes
covered by Brown Shoe Company Franchises, and will have no lines conflicting with the
Brown Shoe Company Brands.' " Brief for Appellant, p. 44.
41 370 U.S. at 302. The Court treated the franchise outlets as equivalent to company-
owned stores and failed to recognize that control over the subsidiary is indirect when a
contract is used as a basis for integration. The fact that the agreements were terminable
upon thirty days notice by either party lessens the control to even a greater degree. There-
fore, it is doubtful whether the 645 franchise outlets should be equated with the 500
or so company-owned stores. Whether such a distinction would have altered the analysis
or result of the principal case is rather doubtful, but by making the distinction, the Court
would have correctly analyzed the facts by recognizing the inferiority of such arrangements
as compared with ownership. As the Court determined the case, it left the impression
that any arrangement with a consumer, however loose, will suffice for purposes of showing
supplier-consumer ties. See Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at 4.
42 370 U.S. at 302.
43 1d. at 303.
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shoe manufacturer, accounting for 0.5 per cent of the nation's pro-
duction." Thus, Brown's acquisition of Kinney increased the former's
production to 4.5 per cent by 1956. ' s
Brown was not the only company in the industry whose growth
was obtained by the consolidation of manufacturing and retailing
sources. Beginning in 1947, the industry as a whole moved in this
direction." By 1956 the top four manufacturers-International Shoe
Company, Endicott-Johnson, Brown (including Kinney), and General
Shoe-produced approximately 23 per cent of the nation's footwear."
Concomitantly, a 10 per cent decrease resulted in the number of
shoe producers (from 1,077 to 970) during the period of 1947-54.
While increasing their shoe production, the larger firms also sys-
tematically acquired retail outlets.' Relying upon these facts, the
Court found that a significant trend existed in the shoe industry on
both the manufacturing and retailing levels; this finding also con-
tributed as an "other factor" leading to the proscription of the Brown-
Kinney merger.6O
The natural question arising from this holding is at what degree
or level do such trends contribute to a violation of section 7.51 A
trend that produces concentration equal to that in the automobile or
steel industry quite noticeably deters competition within the scope
of section 7,5" but the shoe industry had not reached those levels of
concentration. Instead of determining specific levels or degrees of
the trend, the Court examined the effect of the trend upon the in-
dustry. Under the Court's analysis, a trend would result either in
"injury to competition"53 or "injury to competitors. 5 4 In the former,
•4 Ibid.
45 179 F. Supp. 721, 727. The district court spoke of 5%, but 4.5% is the more accurate
figure.
4' 370 U.S. at 301.47 Id. at 300.
4 Id. at 301. By 1958, the number of shoe producers had been reduced to 872. Id. at
301 n.6.
4' Ibid. Even though the Court recognized a trend on both the manufacturing and re-
tailing levels, it did not produce a chart or figures showing the year to year acquisitions of
manufacturers or retailers by the leading firms in the shoe industry. The Court, however,
did note the number of retail outlets held by each major producer in 1945 and 1956, but
it failed to supply figures for the intervening years. Merely because there was an increase
in the number of retail outlets acquired over the eleven-year span, it does not necessarily
follow that an upward trend in the acquisition of retail shoe stores continued throughout
this period. It may be that the purchasing of independent stores had leveled off, and might
even have been on the downswing. Therefore, by omitting this detailed study of economic
data, the Court's analysis of a trend in the industry is not factually substantiated.
5 See 1960 Wash. U.L.Q. 371.
5See 45 Cornell L.Q. 96 (1959).
2 Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
5' Kessler & Stern, supra note 9, at 21.54 1d. at 22.
1963]
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the effect on businesses is the sole concern;55 whereas, in the latter,
primary importance is placed upon the result in the market place,
i.e., lower prices, poorer quality, and decreased supply."s In the case
of Brown-Kinney, the Court relied heavily upon the "injury to
competitor" principle. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that "the necessary corollary of . . . [the trend of the
shoe industry was] the foreclosure of independent manufacturers
from markets otherwise open to them.""s To substantiate this con-
clusion, he added:
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
We must give effect to that decision."
The Ninth Circuit had expressed the same sentiment earlier in
Crown-Zellerbach v. FTC:5
Congress was not concerned about increased efficiency; it was con-
cerned about the competitor,-the small business man whose "little
independent units are gobbled up by bigger ones," and about other
competitors whose opportunities to meet the prices of the larger con-
cerns and hence compete with it might be diminished by a merger
which increased the concentration of power in the large organization.
In the principal case, for the first time, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that an important concern of section 7 was the protection of
small business.6" The majority opinion revolved around the "injury
to competitor" approach, even though the Court paid some small
tribute to the "injury to competition" principle."s Thus, the dis-
55 Ibid.
56 Id. at 21-22.
5"370 U.S. at 332.6 1d. at 344.
'9 296 F.2d 800, 825 (9th Cir. 1961).
60 Cf. Maryland & Virginia Milk Prods. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960)
(horizontal merger); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962) (hori-
zontal and vertical merger); Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade
Cas.) 5 70471 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 1962) (vertical integration); Scott Paper Co. v. FTC,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70271 (3d Cir. March 27, 1962) (backward vertical
integration); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1958) (horizontal merger via stock acquisition); United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1960) (hori-
zontal and vertical merger); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (horizontal and vertical merger).
61 This line of thought, however, is not limited to the majority's opinion. The con-
curring opinion of Justice Harlan found this point of primary importance in condemning
the merger. Although he failed to acknowledge that only 22 manufacturers could poten-
tially be damaged by the merger, he prohibited the combination simply because some of
cussion of the nature and purpose of the arrangement and of the
trend in the industry served only as vehicles to effectuate the ma-
jority's interpretation of the statute. The ultimate conclusion to be
drawn from the opinion is that a merger the effect of which "nmay be"
to drive competitors from the market will substantially lessen com-
petition, particularly when there is a definite trend towards con-
stricting competitive opportunities.
Did Congress intend to protect small, locally owned businesses?
Although the committee history suggests that intention," the House
and Senate reports relied upon by the Court expressed only the view
of those in favor of the legislation and not necessarily that of Con-
gress. The act as amended expresses the intent of Congress. It is not
known whether a majority of the legislators intended section 7 to
prevent invasion by larger firms into markets consisting of many
small enterprises. However, the principal case employed this "pro-
tection theory" to aid in proscribing the merger.
D. Position Of The Acquiring Firm In The Market Structure
The fact that it was the fourth largest shoe manufacturer that was
combining with another corporation, regardless of size, seemed to
disturb the Court, although the concern was only implicit in its
analysis. From the tenor of the opinion, the position of a firm within
the market structure will always be an influencing factor in these
cases. In the light of other recent decisions," the importance of
"rank" in the industry is recognizable, since the mergers that have
been condemned as violative of section 7 generally have involved
only major companies." The overtone of the "rank" approach is to
prevent concentration within any industry, thereby effectuating the
the competitors were damaged, irrespective of the quantity. The full weight of his opinion
reflects this approach. Justice Harlan said, 370 U.S. at 373: "[W]hen the volume of . . .
[Kinney's] purchases from independent manufacturers in various parts of the country is
large enough to render it probable that these suppliers, if displaced, will have to fall by
the wayside, it cannot, in my opinion, be said that the effect on the shoe industry is 're-
mote' or 'insubstantial.' "
On the other hand, Justice Clark failed to give credence to either concept by stating
simply that the vertical merger "created a 'reasonable probability' that competition in the
manufacture and sale of shoes on a national basis might be substantially lessened." 370 U.S.
at 357.
62 See H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1950).
' See Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70471 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 27, 1962); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Koppers Co.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 70194 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1962); Union Carbide Co.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) 5 29402; American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.
1953).
, See note 63 supra.
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spirit and purpose of the statute. Congress favored industries with
intense competition as opposed to oligopolistic markets made up of
three or four firms producing most of the output."5 A leading com-
pany which acquires a smaller enterprise may not increase its stand-
ing. However, it does expand its output potential because of its size,
and it does lessen competition by being able to supply more con-
sumers with more goods. That is precisely what the statute is designed
to prohibit. Hence, the rank of a firm within a defined market
structure will always prove to be of great importance in viewing
a merger.
It may be argued that the position of a company in the industry,
coupled with the share of the market foreclosed, will be sufficient for
the courts to block mergers without examining any other factors.
However, it is doubtful if the courts will ever limit themselves to
such a restrictive test. More likely, the courts will consider all factors
in analyzing all mergers, just as in the case of Brown and Kinney.
In any event, position or rank will be weighed, analyzed, and con-
sidered in conjunction with the other factors, even though in fact
it may be the determining issue.
II. CONCLUSION
In the light of the trend towards vertical concentration in the shoe
industry, the Supreme Court condemned the merger between the
fourth largest shoe manufacturer (Brown) and the largest family
shoe retailer (Kinney) in order to prevent a foreclosure of less than
one per cent of the retail buying market. Although it is difficult to
ascertain the importance ascribed to it by the Court, it is clear that
the likely injury to competitors formerly supplying Kinney its retail
needs was also considered. The Court thus has provided itself a num-
ber of broadly-stated criteria by which it can prohibit future
vertical mergers. Unless it can qualify under the "failing firm"
doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. FTC,"6 a merger involving a
large enterprise has little chance of survival. Only combinations by
small businesses trying better to compete in an imperfect market "
or by enterprises producing "competitive, economic, or social ad-
"SSee S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
08280 U.S. 291 (1930). See also 45 Va. L. Rev. 421 (1961).
7 Chief Justice Warren speaking for the majority said:
• . .Congress foresaw that the merger of the two large companies or a large
and a small company might violate the Clayton Act while the merger of two
small companies might not, although the share of the market foreclosed be
identical, if the purpose of the small companies is to enable them in combi-




vantages" ' will avoid the strictures of section 7. The Court has pro-
mulgated several elusive tests which will enable it both to use wide
latitude and to oscillate from a quantitative to a qualitative test in
proscribing mergers. Section 7, as modified in 1950 by Congress,
has moved from limited applicability to potentially unlimited ap-
plication. The ability to predict the outcome of a given merger has
decreased proportionately.
The result of the principal case is justified because of the legis-
lative history of the Act. Congress in amending section 7 intended
to thwart the inch-by-inch destruction of effective competition. A
merger capable of causing that result is properly subject to condem-
nation. No longer is efficiency of production the sole purpose of legis-
lation or the sole criterion for interpreting statutes. The preservation
of competition and competitors is now to be considered in juxtaposi-
tion with the "efficiency of production" concept. Section 7, as con-
strued by the Court, has turned back the inherent centripetal ten-
dency of business. As a result, vertical integration can only be
achieved safely via internal expansion rather than by merger.
William P. Weir
81d. at 334.
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